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Over the past couple of years, many Americans have become famil-
iar with the term racial profiling: the idea that police may use race as a
factor, or the factor, in deciding who to regard as a criminal suspect. In
the context of profiling on the roads, police use traffic stops as a pretext
or an excuse to stop, question, and often search African American and
other minority drivers in numbers far out of proportion to their presence
in the driving population. Indeed, the practice even has its own cultural
nickname; African Americans sometimes say that they get stopped for the
offense of "driving while Black," a cynical twist on the crime of driving
while intoxicated.'
t Copyright 2001 by David A. Harris. All rights reserved.
* Balk Professor of Law and Values, University of Toledo College of Law, and
Soros Senior Justice Fellow, Center on Crime, Communities & Culture.
1. See, e.g., David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses: The
Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544 (1997);
Michael Fletcher, Driven to Extremes: Black Men Take Steps to Avoid Police Stops, WASH.
POST, Mar. 29, 1996, at Al (Black men stopped so often they say they are stopped for the
offense one of them "calls DWB-driving while black."); Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Thirteen
Ways of Looking at a Black Man, NEW YORKER, Oct. 23, 1995, at 56, 59 (constant stops by
police is what "many African Americans know as D.W.B.: Driving While Black.").
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The disproportionate use of pretext stops to "fish" for evidence of
crimes unrelated to driving has long been a daily reality for American
Blacks and other minorities, even if it has until recently been largely invisi-
ble to Whites. But there are now signs that this is changing, and that
Whites have begun to understand that the practice exists and has many
negative, even damaging aspects. For example, in a December 1999 Gallup
Poll, not just a large majority of Blacks, but a majority of Whites said that
they believe that racial profiling is widespread.' This increasing awareness
of the problem of racial profiling is due in no small part to the fact that
statistics demonstrating the disproportionate impact of traffic enforcement
on African Americans and other minorities have become available for the
first time over the last four years. These numbers came as a result of court
actions in Maryland and New Jersey-the former civil, the latter criminal.
The lopsidedness of these statistics surprised many people. In Maryland,
though only seventeen percent of the drivers on the relevant roadway were
Black, well over seventy percent of those stopped and searched were
Black . In New Jersey, the race of the driver was the only factor that pre-
dicted which cars police stopped.4 In both states, the numbers also showed
that the traffic stops police made did not reflect different driving behavior
among minorities; rather, the evidence was clear that all drivers, regardless
of race, violate the traffic code at a nearly uniform high rate.' These find-
ings and those in other studies-performed in different places, at different
times, with different data, and involving different police departments-all
point in the same direction: The disproportionate use of traffic stops against
minorities is not just a bunch of stories, or a chain of anecdotes strung
together into the latest social trend. On the contrary, it is a real, measurable
phenomenon.
But the result has been more than just a change in public perception.
As awareness of these police practices has built, legislatures and even police
departments themselves all over the country have begun to take action.
This began with the Traffic Stops Statistics Act, H.R. 1443, sponsored by
Rep. John Conyers (D. Mich.), which would require that police depart-
2. Frank Newport, Racial Profiling is Seen as Widespread, Particularly Among Young
Black Men, GALLUP PoL NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 9, 1999 (77% of Blacks and 56% of Whites
said they believed "racial profiling," which was described in detail, was widespread). The
wording of the questions on the survey was carefully structured to avoid casting the
practice in a negative light so that respondents could applaud the practice as a crime
fighting tool if they wanted to; nevertheless, over 80% of all people surveyed viewed the
practice as a pernicious tactic that must be curbed. Id.
3. See infra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 36, 49 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 54-67 and accompanying text.
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ments collect basic data on all of their routine traffic stops. These data
would include the race of the driver, the reason for the stop, whether a
search was performed and its legal rationale, and several other important
pieces of information. These data would be collected for two years and
forwarded to the U.S. Department ofJustice for study and analysis. 9 Since
the federal Act's introduction in 1997, state legislators have introduced
similar bills in more than twenty states.10 A number of state bills have
7. H.R. 1443, 106th Cong. (1999). The predecessor of H.R. 1443 was the Traffic
Stops Statistics Act of 1997, H.R. 118, 105th Cong. (1997).
8. H.R. 1443.
9. Id.
10. Alabama, Ala. H.B. 7, 1999 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1999) (requiring data collection in
connection with seat belt law); Ala. S.B. 374, 2000 Reg. Sess. (Feb. 2000) (forbidding
profiling and requiring police departments to have written antiprofiling policies and to
collect data on all traffic stops); Florida, H.B. 1113, 102nd Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2000)
(requiring data collection; a predecessor bill, S.B. 1456, 1999 Reg. Sess., died in com-
mittee on April 30, 1999); Illinois, H.B. 3911, 91st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2000)
(requiring the statewide collection of statistics on all traffic stops); Iowa, S.B. 2183, 78th
Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (Iowa 2000) (requiring police departments to collect data on all
traffic stops); Kansas, H.B. 2683, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2000) (requiring that pro-
posals be sought for traffic stops study that would include data collection); Kentucky, Ky.
S.B. 286, 2000 Reg. Sess. (Feb 2000) (requiring police departments to have written
antiprofiling policies and to collect data on all traffic stops); Maryland, H.B. 225, 2000
Reg. Sess. (Md. 2000) (requiring collection of data on all traffic stops); see also, the prede-
cessor bill, S.B. 430, 1999 Reg. Sess. (Md. 1999) (establishing a task force to study stops
for routine traffic violations); Massachusetts, S.B. 1180, 181st. Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass.
1999) (requiring the collection and study of information relating to routine traffic stops);
Missouri, H.B. 2056, 90th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (Mo. 2000) (requiring police depart-
ments to collect data on all traffic stops); Ohio, H.B. 363, 123d Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess.
(Ohio 1999) (requiring the statewide collection of statistics on all traffic stops); Oklahoma,
S.B. 1444, 47th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Okla. 2000) (making racial profiling by an officer of any
municipal, county, or state law enforcement agency, a misdemeanor); Pennsylvania, H.B.
1649, 182d Gen Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1999) (requiring collection of data on traffic
stops in most to the state's largest municipalities); see also H.B. 2157, 182d Gen Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1999) (requiing training for law enforcement officers); Rhode Island, S.B.
2143, Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2000) (requiring data collection and authorizing attorney general to
conduct a study of all routine traffic stops; H.B. 7164 is the same bill; see also, the prede-
cessor bill, H.B. 8430, Jan. Sess. (R.I. 1997) (requiring superintendent of the state police
to keep statistical data on traffic stops and publish it annually); South Carolina, S.B. 915,
114th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2000) (mandating particular antiprofiling policy);
see also, the predecessor bill, S.B. 778, 113th Gen Assembly, Reg. Sess. (S.C. 1999)
(requiring the collection of traffic stop data by the Highway Patrol and the State Police);
Tennessee, S.B. 2415, 101' Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2000) (requiring data collec-
tion on traffic stops); Georgia, S.B. 376, 145th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2000)
(required racial profiling policy); Virginia, S.B. 743, 2000 Sess. (Va. 2000) (requiring
superintendent of state police to keep statistical data on all traffic stops); see also, the
predecessor bill, H.J.R. Res. 687, 1999 Sess. (Va. 1999) (setting up a joint subcommittee
of both houses of the legislature to study pretextual traffic stops); Washington, S.B. 6683,
56th Leg., 2d Sess. (Wash. 2000) (requiring data collection on traffic stops); and Wiscon-
sin, S.B. 354, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2000) (requiring data collection on traffic
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become law-in Connecticut," North Carolina, 12 Massachusetts, 13 Mis-
• 14 16 18soun, Rhode Island," Tennessee, Washington State, 7 and Kansas. Two
other state legislatures have passed such bills, but the bills have been vetoed
by their states' governors. 9 Even in states that do not require that police
20collect data, many police departments do, including those in Houston,
San Diego,2 ' San Jose,22 and state police in Washington State,
23 Flonda, 24
and Michigan.5 When Jerry Sanders, former Chief of the San Diego Po-
lice Department, made his agency the first in the nation to begin to
collect traffic stop data, he made it clear that even if police didn't feel
that they were doing anything wrong, collecting and disseminating sta-
26tistics was essential for police accountability and community credibility.
All in all, these actions signify a strong trend, one focused not just on
stops); and New Jersey, S.B. 863, 209th Leg. (NJ. 2000) (requiring the superintendent of
state police to collect and analyze data on all traffic stops); A.B. 3502, 209th Leg. (N.J.
2000) (criminal charges); S.B. 650, 209th Leg. (N.J. 2000) (filing of complaints).
11. An Act Concerning Traffic Stop Statistics, 1999 Conn. Acts 99-198 (Reg. Sess.).
12. An Act to Require the Division of Criminal Statistics to Collect and Maintain
Statistics on Traffic Law Enforcement, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-10 (Michie Supp. 1999).
13. 2000 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. 228 (West).
14. 2000 Mo. Laws. §5 590.650, 590.653.
15. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-21.1-4 (2001).
16. TENN. CODE ANN. § 38-1-402 (2001).
17. WASH. R-V. CODE § 43.43.480 (2000).
18. 2000 Kan. Sess. Laws 180.
19. The current California bill is S.B. 1389, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000) (requiring collec-
tion and analysis of data on routine traffic stops). Its predecessor was vetoed in 1999 by
Gov. Gray Davis. S.B. 78, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (requiring collection and analysis of
data on routine traffic stops). In Wisconsin, the proposal Governor Tommy Thompson
vetoed was part of Wisconsin's omnibus two-year budget bill, and as such did not have
its own separate bill number. A new bill with similar provisions has been introduced this
year, despite last year's veto. S.B. 354, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2000).
20. S.K. Bardwell & Lori Rodriguez, HPD to Collect Profiling Data; Police Chief,
Mayor Want to Find Out If Minorities Unfairly Targeted, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 12, 1999,
at 1.
21. See Michael Stetz & Kelly Thornton, Cops to Collect Traffic Stops Racial Data, S.D.
UNIoN-TRIB., Feb. 5, 1999, at Al; see also Julie Ha, Groups Seek Data on Race-Based Police
Stops, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1999, at B3 (discussing San Diego's decision to collect data
because, spokesman said, "we as an organization have nothing to hide.").
22. San Jose Will Track All Stops By Officers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1999, at 29 (San
Jose's chief of police began data collection effort because it is "the right thing to do"
because of strong community perception that improper stops are being made).
23. Angela Galloway, State Patrol to Note Race, Gender in Stops; Effort is Instituted to
Deter Racial Profiling, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 24, 1999, at Al.
24. Mike Brassfield, Most Believe Racial Stops Widespread, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec.
11, 1999, at 3A (Florida Highway Patrol to begin collecting data on traffic stops in 2000).
25. David Shepardson, Cops Will Log Race of Drivers, DETROIT NEWS, December 10,
1999, at At (Michigan State Police to begin tracking race of all drives in January 2000).
26. Stetz & Thornton, supra note 21.
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profiling, but on a whole host of police accountability issues, of which
profiling is the best known by the general public.
Looking ahead, one need not have supernatural powers to predict
what may happen next. Some police agencies and their allies will oppose
any efforts to take even the very modest first step of mandating data
collection. Their efforts may focus on negative effects of data collection;
they may also deny that the experiences of African Americans and Lati-
nos at the hands of the police mean anything. But whatever else they do,
they will almost certainly attack the existing statistics. These data, they
will argue, do not prove racial profiling; they are at best inconclusive,
and fall short of establishing the existence of any social problem, let alone
something as pernicious as racially discriminatory law enforcement prac-
tices in traffic stops. Therefore, they will argue, no further action of any
27kind is necessary.
The data currently available are, in fact, less complete than a statisti-
cian would ideally like. Yet to take these objections at face value misses
the proverbial forest for the trees, and completely ignores the single most
important aspect of the context in which these numbers have been as-
sembled: an environment of (until quite recently) nearly complete
hostility to the idea that police agencies should keep any numbers on
traffic stops or any other area of alleged racial bias in policing. In other
words, the statistics that exist now have all been gathered not just with-
out police cooperation, but with active police opposition and
antagonism, and in the absence of standardized record keeping practices
or even any record keeping at all. It is therefore hardly surprising that the
data is not everything it could be. In fact, the surprising thing is how
good the data have proven to be, considering the roadblocks thrown up
to its collection.
28
If these criticisms were aimed at helping to assure better, more ac-
curate data collection in future studies, everyone concerned with the
problem would welcome it. Ensuring that data would be plentiful, freely
and publicly available, and properly analyzed, in order that the racial
profiling problem receive correct, competent, and unbiased analysis,
could only serve the cause of justice by making for complete and well-
informed discussion. Unfortunately, this is not what I expect. Rather,
27. See, e.g., Heather Mac Donald, The Myth of Racial Profiling, CITY J., Spring 2001
paras. 1, 15 ("The anti-'racial profiling' juggernaut must be stopped, before it obliterates
the crime-fighting gains of the last decade, especially in inner cities .... According to
the racial profiling crowd ... [the] alleged evidence for racial profiling comes in two
varieties: anecdotal, which is of limited value, and statistical, which on examination
proves entirely worthless."), at http://www.city-joumal.org/html/112the-myth.htrr
(last visited May 16, 2001).
28. See, e.g., David Barstow and David Kocieniewski, Records Show New Jersey Police
Withheld Data on Race Profiling, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2000, at Al.
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these arguments will be made as a way to stymie further inquiry, espe-
cially to persuade legislative bodies not to enact any requirement that
statistics on traffic stops be kept. In short, the argument will be that there
is no problem, and thus no need for the scrutiny of police behavior that
data collection would inevitably bring. But this view represents a cynical
stacking of the deck. First, the issue is framed using the highest possible
standard: Is there conclusive statistical proof of profiling? Second, the
burden is placed on those who oppose profiling to make this statistically
conclusive case. Third, the data needed to carry this burden and prove
the case is available only when and if police agencies choose to collect it.
Fourth, since there is resistance on the part of police to the idea that
profiling exists and to any efforts to address it, and since some in law
enforcement see it as in their self-interest to avoid collecting data, they
do not collect data unless forced to do so. The upshot, of course, is that
with no data collected, the case can never be proven, and the party with
the burden of proof-the opponents of profiling-will lose the argu-
ment. Their failure will be foreordained, even in the face of all of the
data collected and analyzed so far.
We should avoid proceeding in this unfortunate direction. This is
not, after all, a question of proving a defendant guilty beyond a reason-
able doubt, or even of proving the existence of some fact in a civil suit.
In the arena of public policy, especially when we debate the effects of the
actions of government officials and institutions, our discussion should be
governed by far different standards-standards that do not allow the
institutions themselves to close off debate simply by allocating the burden
of proof and then by withholding the data or evidence necessary to fully
explore the truth. And in no area of law-or policy-making--should this
be more true than when questions of race and its relationship to criminal
justice arise. Since time out of mind, minorities have complained about
unequal, harsh, and even brutal treatment at the hands of the police.
Even the Supreme Court has acknowledged that aggressive policing has
been used, particularly against Blacks, to control and harass minority
29populations. I propose that in an ongoing debate on questions con-
29. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 n.14 (1968) (acknowledging that these police
practices played an important role in creating "friction" and "resentment" in minority
communities of color regarding police). The Court was not alone in recognizing this
connection. See, e.g., Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders
158, 159-60 (1968) (noting that police departments had begun to adopt so-called aggres-
sive patrol tactics utilizing stops and frisks, "without weighing their tension-creating
effects [between police and Blacks] and the resulting relationship to civil disorder .. ");
United States President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of
justice, Task Force Report: The Police 184 (1967) ("Misuse of field interrogation ... is
causing serious friction with minority groups in many localities. This is becoming par-
ticularly true as more police departments adopt "aggressive patrol," in which officers are
encouraged routinely to stop and question persons on the street who are unknown to
[VOL. 6:237
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cerning the possibility of racial or other types of invidious discrimination
by public institutions, we should apply a prima facie standard to these
claims in the public arena. In other words, if African Americans or Lati-
nos say that they have been the victims of racial profiling, we should not
ask for conclusive proof in the strictest statistical sense; rather, if they can
present some credible evidence beyond anecdotes, some statistics that
indicate that we may, indeed, have a problem, the burden should then
shift to the public institution-here, law enforcement agencies-to col-
lect the information necessary to either confirm or dispel the perception
• 30
that a problem exists. This seems an important ingredient to the proper
understanding and resolution of societal policy arguments and disagree-
ments, especially when the governmental action alleged has such dire
consequences for the individuals affected and for the integrity and legiti-
macy of the institutions themselves. When public confidence in our most
vital institutions of government is undermined, as is clearly already hap-
pening with racial profiling, we ought not be satisfied with the
declaration that conclusive proof is not available, especially when access
to that proof is in every way controlled by the institutions accused of
wrong doing. Instead, when victims present a primafacie case, the burden
should shift to the government to show that its conduct is above re-
proach. Only that type of standard for our public debate on such crucial
issues can ensure the legitimacy of our public institutions
I. THE NUMBERS So FAR: WHAT CURRENT STATISTICS
ON RACIAL PROFILING SHOW
To ground our discussion, we need an idea of what the existing sta-
tistics are and what they say. There have been a number of studies, but I
will focus on three: those from New Jersey, Maryland, and Ohio. And
since I have described these studies in detail elsewhere, 3' I will use a
more "bottom line"-oriented approach here.
Since until recently police rarely kept any records concerning their
conduct in this area, data are scarce. This may be because law
them, who are suspicious, or whose purpose for being abroad is not readily evident.");
Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., as Amicus Curiae at 60-
62, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (Nos. 63, 67, and 74) ("The ill effects of stop and
frisk practices, particularly in the ghetto, is as strong at least as any evidence of their good
effects 'from a purely law enforcement point of view' ..... We are gravely concerned by
the dangers of legitimating stop and frisk, and thus encouraging, and increasing the
frequency of occasions for, police-citizen aggressions. Speaking bluntly, we believe that
what the ghetto does not need is more stop and frisk.").
30. I am not arguing here for a new standard of proof in courts on these questions.
Rather, my point is confined to public debates on important questions of public policy.
31. David A. Harris, The Stories, The Statistics, and The Law: Why "Driving While
Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REv. 265, 275-88 (1999).
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enforcement and the public have only recently recognized the problem,
or because many police agencies still oppose keeping comprehensive
records of traffic stops. 32 Nevertheless, as a result of statistical inquiry in
legal actions (New Jersey and Maryland) and independent academic
research (Ohio), there are now some statistics available.
A. New Jersey
The most rigorous statistical analysis of the racial distribution of
traffic stops comes from criminal litigation in New Jersey. In the late
1980's and early 1990's, African Americans often complained that police
stopped them repeatedly on the New Jersey Turnpike. In 1994, a num-
ber of defendants who alleged that New Jersey State Troopers had
stopped them in racially- or ethnically-biased stops joined in a motion to
suppress evidence filed in State v. Soto. 3 Dr. John Lamberth served as an
expert in the case; his study34 shows how he applied the tools of statistical
analysis to this problem.
The goal of Lamberth's study was "to determine if the State Police
stopp[ed], investigat[ed], and arrest[ed] black travelers at rates signifi-
cantly disproportionate to the percentage of blacks in the traveling
population, so as to suggest the existence of a policy-official or de
32. In 1997, Representative John Conyers of Michigan introduced H.R. 118, the
Traffic Stops Statistics Act, which would require analysis of data on each traffic stop-
including the race of the driver, whether a search took place, and the legal justification
for the search-by the Department ofJustice. Traffic Stops Statistics Act of 1997, 104th
Cong. (1st Sess. 1997). When the bill passed the House of Representatives on a unani-
mous voice vote, the National Association of Police Organizations, an umbrella group
representing more than 4,000 police interest group across the country, announced its
strong opposition to the bill. Robert L. Jackson, Push Against Bias in Traffic Stops Arrested,
L.A. TIMES, June 1, 1998, at A5. Officers would "resent" having to collect the data, a
spokesman for the group said; moreover, there was "no pressing need or justification" for
collecting the data. Id. In other words, there is no problem, so there is no need to collect
data. NAPO's opposition was enough to kill the bill in the Senate in the 104th Congress.
The Conyers bill has now been reintroduced in a slightly modified in the current Con-
gress. The Traffic Stops Statistics Study Act of 1999, H.R. 1443, 106th Cong. (1st Sess.
1999).
33. 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996). There is no doubt that now, this
claim would not succeed if based on the Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution.
Under Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806 (1996), the Fourth Amendment would play no part
in the decision because the motivation of the officer is immaterial, as long as a traffic
offense was, in fact, committed. Id. at 813. As the case was eventually decided, the trial
court granted the motion to suppress based on New Jersey's own law and constitution.
State v. Soto, slip op. at 13-15 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996).
34. Dr. John Lamberth, Revised Statistical Analysis of the Incidence of Police Stops
and Arrests of Black Drivers/Travelers on the New Jersey Turnpike Between Exits or
Interchanges 1 and 3 from the years 1988 Through 1991 (Nov. 11, 1994) (unpublished
statistical report) (on file with the Michigan Journal of Race & Law).
[VOL. 6:237
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facto-of targeting blacks for investigation and arrest." 3 In order to do
this, Lamberth designed a research methodology to detennine two
things: first, the rate at which Blacks were being stopped, ticketed,
and/or arrested on the relevant part of the highway; and second, the
percentage of Blacks among drivers on that same stretch of road. To
ensure further precision, Lamberth also measured the population of vio-
lators of traffic laws, broken down by race. This was important; because
it would answer the question whether disproportionate stops of minority
drivers were due to their driving behavior. All of this data enabled him
to test, carefully and rigorously, whether Blacks were in fact being dis-
proportionately targeted for stops, and whether there was an explanation
for it other than race.
Lamberth's analysis made several things strikingly clear. First, Blacks
36
and Whites violate the traffic laws at almost exactly the same high rate.
Thus driving behavior could not explain differences in how police might
treat Black and White drivers.37 With regard to arrests, 73.2% of those
stopped and arrested were Black; 13.5% of the cars on the road had a
Black driver or occupant. 3 The disparity between these two numbers "is
statistically vast, ' 39 Lamberth pointed out; the number of standard
deviations40 present-54.27-means that the probability that the racial
disparity is a random result "is infinitesimally small., 41 Radio and patrol
logs yielded similar results; Blacks were approximately 35% of those
stopped (but not arrested) though they are only 13.5% of those on the
road-19.45 standard deviations. Considering all stops in all three types
of records surveyed, the chance that 34.9% of the cars combined would
35. Id. at 2 (emphasis in original).
36. Id. at 26.
37. Lamberth's finding was supported by the testimony of several State Police super-
visors and officers. All said that Blacks and Whites drive indistinguishably. Soto, 734 A.2d
at 354-55.
38. Lamberth, supra note 34, at 12, 16.
39. Id. at 20.
40. Lamberth explains that
[t]he accepted convention for statisticians to conclude that a difference is
real and not chance is the finding that if the same study was done many
times, the present results would occur only five times out of a hundred.
This .05 level is determined by computing the number of standard de-
viations that the observed result differs from the expected. The .05 level
of statistical significance is reached at about two standard deviations. The
probability drops to one in 100 when 2.58 standard deviations is
reached.
Lamberth, infra note 44, at 8-9.
41. Lamberth, supra note 34, at 21.
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have Black drivers or occupants "is substantially less than one in one
billion., 42 Lamberth concluded:
Absent some other explanation for the dramatically dispro-
portionate number of stops of blacks, it would appear that
the race of the occupants and/or drivers of the cars is a de-
cisive factor or a factor with great explanatory power. I can
say to a reasonable degree of statistical probability that the
disparity outlined here is strongly consistent with the exis-
tence of a discriminatory policy, official or de facto, of
targeting blacks for stop and investigation.4 3
B. Maryland
A short time after completing his analysis of the New Jersey data,
John Lamberth conducted a study of traffic stops by the Maryland State
Police on Interstate 95 between Baltimore and the Delaware border." In
1993, an African American Harvard Law School graduate named Robert
Wilkins filed a federal lawsuit against the Maryland State Police.4 Wilk-
ins alleged that he and his family were stopped, subjected to questioning,
46
and had their car searched by a drug-sniffing dog because of their race.
When a State Police memo instructing troopers to look for drug couri-
ers-described as "mostly black males and black females" 47-- surfaced
during discovery, the State Police settled with Wilkins. As part of the
settlement, they agreed to give the court data on every stop followed by
a search conducted with the driver's consent or with a dog for two and a
half years. ' These data and others Lamberth and his team gathered al-
lowed him to conclude, as he had in New Jersey, that Blacks and Whites
drove no differently; the percentages of Blacks and Whites violating the
42. Id. at 25.
43. Id. at 25-26.
44. John Lamberth, Report of John Lamberth, PH.D. (Nov. 8, 1996) (unpublished
statistical report, Temple University, Dep't of Psychology) (on file with the Michigan
Journal of Race & Law).
45. Complaint, Wilkins v. Md. State Police (Civil No. MJG-93-468) (D. Md. 1993)
(on file with the Michigan Journal of Race & Law).
46. Id. at 3. For a more complete description of the Wilkins case, see Harris, supra
note 1, at 563-66.
47. Maryland State Police, Criminal Intelligence Report (Apr. 27, 1992) (unpublished
report) (on file with the Michigan Journal of Race & Law).
48. Settlement Agreement at 9, Wilkins v. Md. State Police, (D. Md. 1993) (Civ.
No. MJG-93-468) (on file with the Michigan Journal of Race & Law).
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traffic code was virtually indistinguishable.49 More importantly, Lam-
berth's analysis found that although 17.5% of the population violating the
traffic code on the road he studied was Black, more than 72% of those
stopped and searched were Black; in more than 80% of the cases, the
person stopped and searched was a member of some racial minority. 5°
The disparity between 17.5% Black and 72% stopped includes 34.6 stan-
dard deviations."1 Such statistical significance, Lamberth said, "is literally
off the charts.,1 2 Though he used language that exhibited restraint and
caution, Lamberth came to a devastating conclusion.
While no one can know the motivations of each individual
trooper in conducting a traffic stop, the statistics presented
herein, representing a broad and detailed sample of highly
appropriate data, show without question a racially discimi-
natory impact on blacks ... from state police behavior
along 1-95. The disparities are sufficiently great that taken as
a whole, they are consistent with and strongly support the
assertion that the Maryland State Police target[ed] the
community of black motorists for stop, detention, and in-
vestigation within the Interstate 95 corridor.1
3
C. Ohio
In the spring of 1998, members of the Ohio General Assembly who
wanted to sponsor legislation to require data collection on traffic stops
asked that I gather some preliminary statistical evidence of the existence
of a racial disparity in traffic enforcement in the state. This, they said,
would help them persuade their colleagues to support such an effort. The
methodology I used illustrates how one might attempt to analyze this
type of problem when the best data are not available. Two circumstances
made the task more difficult than that faced by John Lamberth in New
Jersey and Maryland. First, there are no statewide data on routine traffic
stops in Ohio that can be correlated with race. Similarly, no sizable po-
lice department in the state keeps any data at all of its traffic stops that
could be broken down by race.5 4 Another way of finding out who was
49. Lambreth, supra note 44, at 4.
50. Id. at 8.
51. Statewide, State Police found drugs on virtually the same percentages of Black
and White drivers. Id. at 7-8. This means that even though Blacks were much more
likely to get stopped and searched than Whites were, they were no more likely to have
drugs, putting the supposed justification for these stops in grave doubt.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 10.
54. The one exception is the Ottawa Hills Police Department; Ottawa Hills is a
small (approximately 4,000 residents, and almost exclusively White) incorporated village
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stopped would have to be found. Second, the legislators wanted numbers
from different parts of an entire state. While Lamberth's methods worked
well in ascertaining the driving populations of particular stretches of
individual, limited access highways-the New Jersey Turnpike and 1-95
in Maryland-applying the same method to an entire city, even a me-
dium-sized one, would require a different methodology. To do this in
cities and towns across an entire state would, of course, be more so. Thus
another method had to be found to ascertain the Black population on the
road.
Since law enforcement agencies kept no complete records, I ob-
tained data from municipal courts in four Ohio cities in order to find out
the percentage of Blacks stopped. Municipal courts in Ohio handle all
low-level criminal cases5" and virtually all of the traffic citations issued in
the state. Most of these courts also generate a computer file for each case,
and that file includes the race of the defendant as part of a physical de-
scription. Using municipal court data enabled me to obtain a breakdown
of all tickets correlated with the race of the driver for Toledo, Akron,
and Dayton, and for Franklin County, which includes Columbus and
surrounding suburbs. The downside of using this data is that it only
includes stops in which police have given citations. Stops resulting in no
action or a verbal warning are not included. In all likelihood, using tick-
ets alone might underestimate any racial bias that is present in stops; the
root of police discrimination lies in discretionary actions, and stops not
resulting in citations or arrests likely represent the exercise of the most
16discretion. Since using tickets could underestimate any possible racial
bias, it makes any resulting calculations conservative, i.e., it tends to give
law enforcement the benefit of the doubt. Similarly, the way the statistics
are grouped in the analysis is also conservative because I have used only
two categories of drivers: Black and non-Black. In other words, all mi-
norities other than African Americans are lumped together with Whites,
even though some of these other minorities, notably Hispanics, have also
complained about targeted stops directed at them. Using conservative
assumptions means that if a bias does show up in the analysis, we can be
in Lucas County, Ohio. Village policy requires that officers issue either a ticket or a
written warning for each stop, and both warnings and tickets include a space to note the
driver's race.
55. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 5 1901.20 (1998 & Supp. 2000) (detailing municipal
court criminal and traffic jurisdiction). Some small number of citations are handled by
mayor's courts, which still exist in certain areas of the state; see also OHio RaV. CODE
ANN. 5 1905.01 (1998 & Supp. 2000) (setting out jurisdiction of mayor's courts for
ordinance and traffic violations).
56. See, e.g., Expert Report of John J. Donohue at 12, Moser v. Vill. of Mount
Prospect, 12 F. Supp. 2d 780 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (No. 98 C 7580) (the more severe the
police action-from stop to citation to arrest-the more likely it is that defendant's
behavior dictates police action) (on file with the Michigan Journal of Race & Law).
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relatively confident that it exists."7 These numbers allow us to calculate
the percentage of all tickets issued in 1996, 1997, and the first four
months of 1998"' that were issued to Blacks by the Toledo, Akron, and
Dayton Police Departments and all of the police departments in Franklin
County."' We then need to compare these data to the other number
needed for the analysis: a baseline of drivers on the road, broken down
by race. Since direct observation of driving populations all over a state is
simply not practical, another approach that would yield a reasonable
estimate of the driving population was devised. Data from the U.S.
Census breaks down the populations of states, counties, and individual
cities by race and by age. This data is readily available and easy to use.6O
Using this data, a reasonable basis for comparison with ticketing percent-
ages can be constructed: Black versus non-Black driving age population.
This was done by breaking population down both by race and by age.
By selecting a lower and upper age limit-fifteen and seventy-five, re-
spectively61-for driving age, the data yield a reasonable reflection of
57. For at least Toledo and Akron, these numbers represent the total number of
traffic cases, not individual tickets; some cases include more than one ticket given to the
driver on the same occasion. By sheer coincidence, the data for Toledo were produced
twice-first, tabulating all tickets, and then all cases. The data tabulating cases came to me
by accident. The data were different; in the data on tickets, Blacks were 35% of those
ticketed; in the data concerning cases, Blacks were 31%. These data showed that Blacks
were more likely than non-Blacks to receive more than one ticket in the same stop, an
interesting fact in its own right. Because I am interested in measuring traffic stops and am
using ticketing only as a way to estimate stops, I have used the data on cases; after all,
even if more than one ticket is issued in any given encounter, the driver was only
stopped once. Using only the ticketing data will also keep the analysis conservative, so as
to underestimate any bias that might be present and lend additional credence to any
conclusion. It is of course possible that the fact that Blacks receive more than one ticket
per incident more often than Whites is itself a reflection of race-based policing, but there
may be other factors at work here as well, such as Blacks may tend to drive older cars
than Whites that may have more obvious safety violations, or that Blacks may use seat
belts less often than Whites. Therefore, for purposes of this study, I have chosen to treat
this difference as if it is not evidence of racial bias.
58. Data from Franklin County Municipal Court include only the years 1996 and
1997, but none from 1998.
59. Franklin County Municipal Court data include all communities in the county,
not just Columbus, but were not listed in a way that allowed separate numbers to be
broken out for individual police departments. See Memorandum from Mike Pirik, Chief
Deputy Clerk, Franklin County Municipal Court, to David Harris (Aug. 28, 1998) (on
file with the Michigan Journal of Race & Law).
60. The data in this portion of the study were obtained from the Census Bureau's
web site, http://www.census.gov.
61. Fifteen and seventy-five are arbitrary choices, but they are reasonable ones.
Fifteen is generally the minimum age at which states allows juveniles to obtain a driving
permit. While many people do drive above age seventy-five, it is also the age at which
population in general begins to drop fairly dramatically. See U.S. Census, 1990 Census
Data, available at http://www.census.gov. Also, the Census data breaks people down by
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what we would expect to find if we surveyed the roads themselves. The
data on driving age population can also be sharpened by using informa-
tion from the National Personal Transportation Survey, a study done
every five years by the Federal Highway Administration of the U.S.Deparmentof . 62
Department of Transportation. The survey indicates that 21% of Black
households have no vehicle.63 If the driving age population figure is
reduced by 21%, this gives us another baseline figure.
Comparing ticketing percentages for Blacks and the two baseline
numbers can then be compared by constructing a "likelihood ratio": a
number that will show whether or not Blacks are receiving tickets in
numbers that are out of proportion to their presence in the driving age
population and the driving age population less 21%.64 The likelihood
ratio will allow the blank in the following sentence to be filled in: "If
you're Black, you're __ times as likely to be ticketed by this police
department than if you are not Black." A likelihood ratio of approxi-
mately one means that Blacks received tickets in roughly the proportion
one would expect, given their presence in the driving age population. A
likelihood ratio of much greater than one indicates that Blacks are re-
ceiving tickets at a rate higher than would be expected. Using both
baselines-the Black driving age population, and the Black driving age
ages into five-year blocks, and both fifteen and seventy-five allow the analysis to use these
existing break points.
62. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., 1995 NATIONWIDE PERSONAL TRANSPORTATION SURVEY
(1995), available at http://www-cta.oml.gov/npts. The NPTS contains other data that
could also be used to sharpen the driving age population figures in the same way. For
example, Whites take an average of 4.4 private vehicle trips daily; Blacks take an average
of 3.9. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., OUR NATION'S TRAVEL: 1995 NPTS EARLY RESULTS 27
(1995), available at http://www-cta.oml.gov/npts/1995/Doc/NPTSBooklet.pdf. This
leads to the inference that, proportionately, there are likely to be fewer Blacks in the
driving population than Whites at any given time. I have not used these figures in the
analysis, but it would be reasonable to do so.
63. Email from Eric Hill, Center for Urban Transportation Research, to David
Harris (Oct. 9, 1998) (on file with the Michigan Journal of Race & Law).
64. I credit John Lamberth with this idea, and for teaching me to work with this
data. (He also performed some of the early analysis in the study and served as a constant
check on my work. To say that I am thankful for his help does not fully express the
depth of my gratitude. Of course, any errors made here should be attributed to me.) A
likelihood ratio is arrived at by first getting the ratio of Blacks ticketed to Blacks in the
relevant population. Then the ratio of non-Blacks ticketed to non-Blacks in the same
population is calculated. The first number is then divided by the second. For example, for
ticketing by the Toledo Police compared to Toledo's Black driving age population,
Blacks ticketed are 30.8 percent, and Blacks in the driving age population are 17.9 per-
cent; .308/.179 = 1.7206. Non-Blacks are 69.2 percent of those ticketed, and 82.1
percent of the driving age population; .692/.821 = .8428 the likelihood ratio is
1.7206/.8421, or 2.04.
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population less 21%--the likelihood ratios for the Toledo,6 s Dayton,
66Akron and Franklin County are presented in Table 1.
TABLE I
LIKELIHOOD RATIO "IF You'RE BLACK, YOU'RE
TIMES As LIKELY To GET A TICKET IN THIS CITY
THAN IF You ARE NOT BLACK"
City Black Driving Black Driving





Akron P.D. 2.04 2.73
Toledo P.D. 2.02 2.7
Dayton P.D. (Dayton) 1.8 2.5
Source: U.S. Census Bureau
** Source: National Personal Transportation Survey, Federal Highway
Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation (1995); Eric Hill, Research
Associate, Center for Urban Transportation Research
Includes all police agencies in Franklin County, not just Columbus
As is surely obvious, the method used here to attempt to discover
whether racial disparity in traffic enforcement is a problem in Ohio is less
exact than the method used in New Jersey and Maryland. There are
assumptions built into the analysis at several points, all in an attempt to
arrive at reasonable substitutes for observation-based data. But all of the
assumptions are conservative, calculated to err on the side of caution.
67
65. For a comparison of the Toledo Police Department with other local police
departments in Lucas County, Ohio, see David A. Harris, "Driving While Black": Do We
Have a Problem Here in Toledo?, TOLEDO CITY PAPER, Apr. 1999, at 15.
66. With the exception of Franklin County, the data could be broken down sepa-
rately for these city police departments, and data for suburban or special jurisdiction
police departments could be eliminated from the analysis. For Franklin County Municipal
Court, which covers Columbus, the data for all of the police departments in the county
were aggregated and could not be separated by department.
67. According to sociologist and criminologist Joseph E. Jacoby, the numbers used
here probably are flawed-Blacks are probably "at an even greater risk of being stopped"
than these numbers show. Emails from Joseph E. Jacoby, Bowling Green State Univer-
sity, to David Harris (Feb. 2 & 3, 1999) (on file with the Michigan Journal of Race &
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What do these figures mean? Even when conservative assumptions
are built in, likelihood ratios for Akron, Dayton, Toledo, and Franklin
County, Ohio, all either approach or exceed 2.0. In other words, Blacks
are about twice as likely to be ticketed as non-Blacks are. When the fact
that 21% of Black households do not own a vehicle is factored in, the
ratios rise, with some approaching 3.0. Assuming that ticketing is a fair
mirror of traffic stops in general-another conservative assumption-the
data suggest that a "driving while Black" problem does indeed exist in
Ohio. There may be race-neutral explanations for the statistical pattern,
but none seems obvious. At the very least, further study--something that
a data collection bill might mandate so that more accurate data could be
used-is needed.
II. THE COMING BACKLASH: CRITICISM OF THE
CURRENT STATISTICS
With some familiarity with the best statistical information available
on racial profiling on the road, we can now examine the arguments that
will be made to contradict it. These arguments come down to several
separate but related ideas; all concern information missing from the ex-
isting data.
A. The Data Do Not Include All Stops Police Make
This is a common criticism. A full picture of police traffic stop
practices, the argument goes, must include data not just on traffic cita-
tions, but all stops police make, whether a citation is issued or not. Police
do not issue tickets every time they make a traffic stop; as everyone who
has ever been stopped knows (and hopes), officers have discretion to
issue a warning, sometimes written, often simply verbal, in lieu of actu-
ally citing the driver for any infraction. In fact, most drivers have
probably attempted-whether through overt request or something more
subtle, such as a cooperative attitude or an outright confession of wrong-
doing-to persuade a police officer not to issue a ticket. For their part,
police officers may decide to forgo the more formal ticket if the driver
and vehicle turn up "clean" in a computerized records check, and if the
Law). For example, Blacks are likely to drive fewer miles than Whites; the National
Personal Transportation Survey, which reports that Whites average 4.4 vehicle trips daily
and Blacks average 3.9, supports Jacoby's contention. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., OUR
NATION's TRAVEL, supra note 62, at 27. Since better data do not exist, all of the assump-
tions made in the analysis involve some speculation. But the important point, Jacoby says,
is that all of the assumptions probably result in an underestimate of the risk of Blacks being
stopped. In statistical terms, the biases in the assumptions are additive, not offsetting.
Emails from Jacoby, supra.
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offense is not of the most serious type. Thus any statistical analysis that
relies on traffic tickets alone risks basing any conclusions on an incom-
plete picture, and should be disregarded.
This very criticism has been made of my own work in Ohio. Be-
cause data on all stops-both with and without citations-were not
available on a statewide or even local basis,68 I used data on traffic tickets
for the four metropolitan areas I studied. As discussed above and else-
where, there is reason to believe that the data I used may actually
underestimate the presence of any bias against African Americans.69 Nev-
ertheless, it is true that the data are less complete than would be ideal.
B. The Data Do Not Include Violator Rates
Another criticism will be that the data do not include violator rates:
the rates at which various populations of drivers violate the traffic laws.
The idea of including them in any study is that what one ideally wants is
a comparison between the rates at which any particular group could have
been stopped, because they violated the law, and the rate at which they
were, in fact, stopped. This comparison, the argument goes, is what will
show whether or not the police stop particular groups at rates dispropor-
tionate to what their driving behavior indicates would be justified. Put
another way, perhaps the reason for racially disproportionate stops is not
race at all, but driving behavior between racial groups. Only two stud-
ies-those in New Jersey and Maryland-have included violator rates.
Others, including mine, have not.
Including violator rates is indeed useful, but this argument can only
be taken so far. It is indeed important to know whether the driving of
different racial groups might differ so much that this behavior could
explain who police stop. The New Jersey and Maryland studies showed
beyond any doubt that this hypothesis did not hold up: almost everyone,
in every racial and ethnic group, was violating the traffic laws at the same
rate. 70 And this strongly supported the testimony of every law enforce-
ment officer in the New Jersey case who was asked about it; all said,
without qualification, that minority and White drivers did not drive
differently from one another.7 '
Beyond these facts, state traffic laws themselves show why the
violator rate is less important than it might at first seem. An examination
of any state's vehicle code shows that it contains an incredible array of
68. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 36, 49 and accompanying text.
71. State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350, 354-55 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) (specifying
that all officers who testified said that there were no racial and ethnic differences in
driving behavior).
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offenses-not just the usual "moving violations" like speeding, failing to
signal a lane change, and not stopping at a light or stop sign, but a
catalogue of vehicular arcana that few people know exists. Add to this an
almost equally voluminous array of regulations concerning vehicle
equipment-required mirrors and lights, tire tread depth, darkness of
tinted glass, and the like-and the conclusion is inescapable: there's an
offense for every driver during any short drive. In fact, in the jurisdiction
in which I formerly worked, police officers had the "three block" rule:
no driver could drive for longer than three blocks without violating some
aspect of the traffic code. This means that the violator rate is only so
important: unless we see marked differences in driving patterns between
racial groups (and the New Jersey and Maryland data, as well as the
police testimony in New Jersey, tell us that we don't), everyone can be
stopped with justification. Thus it isn't a question of who is breaking the
law at what rate; rather, it's a question of who police decide to enforce
the law against, since everyone is breaking traffic laws almost all the time
at the same rate.
C. The Data Do Not Account for Different Levels
of Police Discretion in Stops
This is a more subtle form of the argument about violator rates. Es-
sentially the idea is that not all traffic violations are equally likely to draw
police attention and intervention. For example, erratic driving behav-
ior--swerving from lane to lane, driving far too fast, and failure to
exercise control of the vehicle-that could indicate driving while intoxi-
cated will almost always result in a stop. Catching drunk drivers and
eliminating the great safety hazard they pose is a top priority for most
police departments, and the risks to public safety posed by an intoxicated
driver are immediate, so any officer who notices this type of driving is
highly likely to pull the car over. These could be termed low discretion
stops-situations in which almost any officer would be very likely to
make a stop. In contrast, violations like driving a few miles an hour over
the speed limit, failing to signal a lane change, or a minor defect in a
piece of equipment, such as a cracked taillight lens, which do not pose
much of an immediate safety hazard might be called "high discretion"
stops: offenses for which officers would only stop a vehicle if they had
some reason other than the traffic violation itself to do so. There might
even be a middle group of offenses-a medium discretion category-
consisting of those violations more likely to attract attention and result in
stops than the high discretion group, but not by any means nearly certain
to do so, as with evidence of drunk driving. Examples of this might be
exceeding the speed limit by more than fifteen miles per hour, but with-
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out evidence of recklessness that might accompany drunken driving.7 2 As
one government report put it, the level of discretion exercised would
vary according to behavior, and if different groups of drivers vary in the
driving behaviors this is an alternative hypothesis that must be ex-
plained7 3
It is almost certainly true, however, that the number of high discre-
tion traffic offenses will be small, relative to the massive amount of
regulation in state vehicle codes. For every infraction like drunken or
reckless driving, which are immediate threats to public safety, there may
be a hundred or more that are regulatory in nature. Moreover, one
wonders how easy it will be to separate medium from high discretion
offenses; indeed, the line between them may prove to be illusory.
This argument also confuses two important ideas. Drivers who
commit dangerous traffic offenses may be at greater risk of police inter-
vention. But this does not necessarily mean that there is greater police
activity organized and taking place concerning these offenses. Put simply,
risk of enforcement is not the same thing as actual enforcement.14 While
it would not be surprising if, in this instance, there was higher actual
enforcement of laws against these offenses, this represents an unproven
assumption.
D. The Data are Not Adjusted to Reflect Differentials in Police
Deployment, Which Often Depend on Crime Rates
This argument seeks to explain higher levels of traffic stops of mi-
norities as a consequence of heavier police presence in minority
neighborhoods. Areas with higher minority populations, the argument
runs, tend to have higher crime rates in general. As a consequence, po-
lice departments often react by assigning greater numbers of officers,
patrol cars, and other resources to these neighborhoods. This is where
there is greater demand for police services, so it makes sense to have
more officers in the area. As a consequence, there are more traffic stops
72. See DEBORAH RAMIREZ ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE A RESOURCE GUIDE ON
RACIAL PROFILING AND DATA COLLECTION SYSTEMS: PROMISING PRACTICES AND LESSON
LEARNED 81-82 (2000) (on file with the Michigan Journal of Race & Law).
73. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RACIAL PROFILING: LIMITED DATA AVAILABLE ON
MOTORIST STOPS 19 (2000) (calling driving behavior a "plausible alternative explanation"),
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?Ipaddress=162.140.64.21&
filename=gg00041 .pdf&directory=/diskb/wais/data/gao.
74. See Samuel Walker, Traffic Stop Data Collection: Making Sense of the Data 23
(2000) (distinguishing between "exposure to potential police intervention" and actual
officer behavior) (unpublished manuscript, University of Nebraska at Omaha) (on file
with the Michigan Journal of Race & Law).
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in these areas, the argument goes. Since these areas are heavily populated
by minorities, we should expect more stops of minority drivers there.75
On closer examination, this argument does not hold up. First, as
with the argument concerning levels of discretion differing with the type
of violation observed,76 this viewpoint confuses the risk of enforcement
with actual levels of police activity. It is true that people in areas with
larger numbers of police present are at higher risk to encounter a police
officer, whether driving, walking or simply waiting for a bus. But this
does not mean that police enforcement activity would be organized,
targeted, or used in ways that would in fact result in more traffic stops in
these neighborhoods. In fact, the opposite might well be true. If police
officers are in these areas to fight higher levels of crime, it seems plausible
that they may be focused away from traffic enforcement relative to what
might be done in another neighborhood with less crime.
Second, the evidence does not support this argument. A test of the
deployment hypothesis comes from the analogous practice of using stops
and frisks to assert a police presence and deter and detect crime. In the
wake of the shooting of African immigrant Amadou Diallo by four
members of the New York Police Department's aggressively proactive
Street Crimes Unit, many people alleged that police targeted minorities
with stops and frisks with a frequency that bordered on harassment. The
Police Department denied the allegations, arguing that the aggressive use
of stops and frisks was in direct proportion to the crime rates of the areas
that they patrolled, and had nothing to do with the race of those
stopped. In an effort to learn the truth, the office of New York State
Attorney General Elliot Spitzer undertook a study of the records of
175,000 stops and frisks by the NYPD over a period of fifteen months.
The study was designed to control for crime rates and the racial compo-
sitions of the neighborhoods. The results were disturbingly stark.
[B]lacks comprise 25.6% of the City's population, yet
50.6% of all persons "stopped" [during the period] were
black. Hispanics comprise 23.7% of the City's population
yet, 33.0% of all "stops" were of Hispanics. By contrast,
whites are 43.4% of the City's population, but accounted
for only 12.9% of all "stops". . . . Blacks comprise 62.7% of
all persons stopped by the SCU [NYPD's Street Crimes
Unit] .... [After accounting for the effect of differing crime
rates, during the covered period,] blacks were "stopped" 23%
more often than whites, [across all crime categories. In addi-
75. E.g., SAN JOsE, CALIFORNIA POLICE DEP'T, VEHICLE STOP DEMOGRAPHIC STUDY
FIRST REPORT 6-1 to 6-2 (1999).
76. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
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tion, after accounting for the effect of differing crime rates,]
Hispanics were stopped 39% more often than whites [across
crime categories] .... 
When crime rate is used to project a stop rate for each precinct,
precincts (mostly minority precincts) with the highest stop rates had stop
rates in excess of what would be predicted simply based upon their crime
rates. By contrast, precincts with the lowest stop rates (mostly White
precincts) had stop rates far below what would be predicted based upon
their crime rates.78 In other words, in a situation closely analogous to the
use of traffic stops, utilizing data from the police themselves covering
tens of thousands of police/citizen encounters, the "stops follows de-
ployment" argument does not hold water. Racial bias still shows
through.
III. STACKING THE DECK: THE BURDEN OF PROOF
AND THE LACK OF DATA
If the dominant thrust of each argument criticizing current data
collection practices is that more, better and more detailed data would
improve our knowledge of what is happening in policing, surely every-
one would agree. This, in fact, is the thrust of the main arguments of
proponents of data collection on traffic stops: collect the data to give us a
thorough understanding of the reality on the streets. It is in everyone's
interest to have a complete set of facts to work from; only with solid
information can we come to accurate and defensible judgments that must
underlie any good policy decision.
But arguing for more or better data collection is not, in fact, the
way that opponents will structure their arguments. Instead, the argu-
ments concerning incomplete data and alternative explanations for
profiling will become reasons not to gather data. The reasoning may bear
a resemblance to sophisticated social science, but in fact it closes the door
to any real inquiry aimed at learning the facts. The evidence, the argu-
ment goes, is simply inconclusive; it does not-indeed, could not-
demonstrate the existence of racial bias in traffic enforcement. Therefore,
there is simply no basis to conclude that any problem exists."
77. OFFICE OF THE N.Y. ATTORNEY GEN., THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPART-
MENT'S "STOP AND FRISK PRACTICES" Ch. 5 pt. 1A (1999), available at http:
www. oag.state. ny.us/press/reports/stop-frisk/stop-frisk.html.
78. Id.
79. Study Indicates Blacks Receive More Tickets, AMARILLo GLOBE-NEws, Oct. 4, 2000
(despite study showing Blacks more likely than Whites to be ticketed in Texas, chair of
state Department of Public Safety refused to take any action because study is flawed and
"I'm not going to start a massive investigation unless and until there is some indication
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And this is where the debate goes off the track. In the name of
seeking conclusive proof, opponents of any action to address profiling
stack the deck. It is one thing to wish for conclusive proof, based on the
best possible data. But it is another thing entirely to say that there is no
problem to address because the data can't prove it, when police themselves
have the power to collect the data but refuse to do so. Police departments
themselves could begin efforts to collect the data available that would
prove or disprove the existence of profiling. More than a hundred de-
partments nationwide, including those in Houston, San Jose, San Diego,
and state police in Michigan, Florida, Washington State and many other
jurisdictions, have already begun to do.8° The answers are, in other
words, completely within their power to obtain. Are there difficult
questions and choices to be made on how any individual police depart-
ment does this? Assuredly. Won't this cost money? No doubt it will,
though not as much as opponents seem to think it may. But simply say-
ing it will be hard or cost a lot does not mean that the problem does not
exist. In fact, proof-whether or not it demonstrates that a problem
exists-is within reach, as long as we have the desire to know the answer
and the political will to do the work necessary to know the truth. But by
casting the burden on the opponents of profiling to prove their assertions
conclusively, and by refusing at the same time to obtain the necessary
data to settle the question when it is in their power to do so, opponents
manipulate the situation in a way that makes it impossible to meet the
challenge.
This situation brings to mind the U.S. Supreme Court's 1984 deci-
sion in United States v. Leon.8 ' In Leon, the Court considered whether it
should recognize a so-called "good faith" exception to the exclusionary
rule. In the case, a search was performed by police who had obtained a
warrant. It turned out later, however, that the magistrate should not have
granted it.8 2 The police had done exactly what the law required: they had
obtained a warrant from a neutral judicial officer before taking action
that crossed the Fourth Amendment line.83 The question was whether
that something is going on."), available at http://www.amarillonet.com/stories/1O0400/
tex-studyindic.shtml.
80. Robert Tanner, Many Police Agencies Tracking Race, AP, Mar. 2, 2000, LEXIS, AP
File ("well over 100" police agencies nationwide tracking race); KEVIN J. STROM &
MATTHEW R. DUROSE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRAFFIC STOP DATA COLLECTION POLICIES
FOR STATE POLICE, NCJ 180776 (1999) (Listing jurisdictions that collect racial statistics
for traffic stops), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/tsdcp99.pdf See also
supra notes 7-25 and accompanying text.
81. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
82. Id. at 903-04.
83. Id. at 902.
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the trial court should have suppressed the evidence. The warrant was, in
fact, bad, but the police had relied on it in good faith8 4
Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided that trial courts should not
exclude evidence obtained with a warrant later found defective.8" But the
interesting aspect of the case for our purposes is not what the justices
decided, but how. They began by casting their inquiry not as a search for
Fourth Amendment values, history, or guidance, but in another, more
pragmatic direction: a cost/benefit analysis. On the cost side of the
ledger, the Court said that there were substantial costs associated with the
exclusion of probative evidence.86 Exclusion of evidence impedes the
search for truth, and may bring the entire judicial system into disrepute.87
As for benefits, the Court found that the sole purpose of the exclusionary
rule was deterring misconduct by the police or other relevant actors.8 8
Thus the only benefits that might accrue from excluding the evidence
would have to take the form of deterrence. The Court found no evi-
dence that either police officers or magistrates issuing warrants would be
deterred by excluding evidence gathered in good faith reliance on bad
warrants. Police officers in such situations had, after all, done exactly
what we would have wanted: they obtained and acted upon warrants.
There was therefore no reason to think about deterring them, and no
evidence that would support any argument to the contrary. Magistrates
would very likely not even know of any decision to exclude evidence, so
the message exclusion supposedly sends would probably not even get to
them." Quoting an earlier case, the Court summed up its view suc-
cinctly: "No empirical researcher, proponent, or opponent of the
[exclusionary] rule, has yet been able to establish with any assurance
whether the rule has a deterrent effect . . . . 90 With these considerations
in mind, the Court said, applying the exclusionary rule made no sense: it
brought no measurable benefit, at a fairly steep cost. 91
Notice what the Court did in Leon that implicitly decided the
outcome of the case. The burden is placed squarely upon proponents
84. Id. at 904.
85. Id. at 905, 922.
86. Id. at 907.
87. Id. at 908.
88. Id. at 908-09. Of course, the purposes of the exclusionary rule were not always
thought to be so limited. Cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-660 (1961) (rule serves
both to deter police misconduct and to uphold judicial integrity).
89. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916-917.
90. Id. at 918 (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 452 n.22). Of course,
this is no longer true. See Myron W. Orfield, Deterrence, Penury and the Heater Factor: An
Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. R.Ev. 75, 83 (1992) (all
actors in the criminal justice system report that exclusionary rule deters police miscon-
duct, particularly in "big" cases).
91. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922.
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of applying the exclusionary rule. They must demonstrate the existence
of benefits outweighing the "substantial" costs of suppression. The only
possible benefit of deterrence was one that could never be proven
because, as the Court said, there were no data to support either side of
the argument. By structuring the discussion in this way, the outcome is
foreordained. Requiring empirical proof when no data exist, and then
allocating the burden to one side or the other, means that the party
with the burden will lose every time. The dissenting justices made
exactly this point.
The Court has sought to turn this uncertainty [over whether
the exclusionary rule deters] to its advantage by casting the
burden of proof upon the proponents of the rule .... [But]
"the assignment of the burden of proof on an issue where
evidence does not exist and cannot be obtained is outcome
determinative. [The] assignment of the burden is merely a
way of announcing a predetermined conclusion." 92
What is happening in the discussion of racial profiling statistics is
even worse than what happened in Leon. Just as in Leon, the empirical
evidence-at least in the best form-exists only rarely now, as a result of
rare phenomena such as lawsuits. But unlike in Leon, these data can, in
fact, be obtained by the very people who say there is no evidence. But as
long as they continue to refuse to collect data, they win the argument.
Thus the refusal to collect data even as police departments continue to
assert that they have no problem with racial profiling can in the last
analysis be seen as nothing less than a grand manipulation. When you
don't like your opponents' assertions and you control the flow of infor-
mation, insist on conclusive proof while at the same time cutting off the
flow of data.
IV. PROPOSAL: SHIFTING THE BURDEN BY PRESENTING A
PRIMA FACIE CASE ON PUBLIC POLICY QUESTIONS
INVOLVING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
The analogy to the Leon case exposes the fundamental flaw in the
argument of those challenging racial profiling statistics. They cast the
debate in a form that gives them ultimate control of the facts, and then
refuse to produce them. Thus what should be-must be-an open, fair,
and accurate discussion of a vitally important issue-the role that race
may be playing in our criminal justice system-becomes instead an un-
92. Id. at 942-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Roger B. Dworkin, Fact Style
Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 332-333
(1973)) (last alteration in original).
[VOL. 6:237
Shen Success Breeds Attack
enlightening circle of assertion of the existence of a problem, denial,
refusal to collect the evidence necessary to actually answer the question,
and a conclusion that the assertion has not been proven. No one gains by
this. Those who make the charge that police target minorities for traffic
stops remain angry, frustrated, and unsatisfied, and ultimately come to
regard not only the police but the entire criminal justice with cynicism
and deep distrust. Police officers-not their departments or supervisory
hierarchies, but the on-the-front-lines officers themselves-must do their
already difficult jobs under even more trying conditions when those they
police do not trust them and may regard them as agents of a repressive
system. And the debate does not get resolved. Instead, for African
Americans and other minorities, it becomes just one more festering,
long-term wound set against a background of untold years of accumu-
lated injuries and slights at the hands of police. For police, it becomes
another issue that splits them from everyone else, that encourages an "us
vs. them" mentality in their relations with the public.
There is a better way, and it depends not on new rules for courts or
other tribunals (though these might help) or on newer or more
sophisticated types of proof. Instead, we must focus on the ways that we
understand and conduct our discussions of public policy, particularly on
question of justice and race. In the realm of public policy debate, we
certainly wish to make all of our important decisions based on the best,
most complete information possible. But it cannot help any of us to deny
the existence of a problem because the data could be better, when better
data can become available if we are willing to act. This is especially true
when the problem involves an issue that goes to the heart of what our
country stands for: the allegation that agents of the government itself
who are empowered to enforce the criminal law are doing so on the
odious basis of race. Assertions like these present question of transcendant
importance. Our nation fought a civil war, and in its aftermath added the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution to specifically assure that no
state would ever again deny to any of its people the equal protection of
the laws. The more than one hundred years since the Fourteenth
Amendment have seen a more or less continuous struggle for equal
protection, peaking in the 1950's and 60's with the struggles for civil
rights and the dismantling of the Jim Crow system in the South. An
integral part of this struggle was the effort to set limits on policing,
particularly as it had been used as an instrument of racial oppression.93
93. E.g., Michael J. Klarman, Is the Supreme Court Sometimes Irrelevant? Race and
the Southern Criminal Justice System in the World War II Era (Dec. 2000) (unpublished
manuscript, University Of Virgina School of Law) ("the linkage between the birth of
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This was a consistent theme of the Warren Court's criminal procedure
cases, in which the Court asserted unprecedented power over police in
the states in order to assure that all citizens were treated fairly, regardless
of race or ethnicity.
In this context, a question of racially biased law enforcement raises
an issue of paramount importance for our republic and the ideals of our
government. It challenges the legitimacy of the entire criminal justice
system, and without a satisfactory resolution threatens to corrode the rule
of law that bind us together as Americans. Because issues of race and law
enforcement are so vital, they should not be approached in the way we
might consider either a scientific question-for example, a requirement
that a new drug be proven safe and effective before it can be made avail-
able-or a question in the courts, in which the complaining party would
have to carry the burden of proof or lose. Instead, we should use a differ-
ent concept: the idea of a prima facie case. The prima facie case is an idea
familiar to everyone who works with the law. In the simplest terms, it
means that a party making an assertion of an injury or wrongdoing by
another must advance some evidence-not necessarily conclusive proof,
but some credible evidence-that tends to prove the case. When this
prima facie burden is met, the burden then shifts to the other party to
offer evidence rebutting it. In the case of allegations of racially-biased
activity by a government agency, presenting some evidence of profiling,
even if it is not conclusive, should shift the burden to the agency to at
least collect the data or information that would allow the truth of the
allegations to be tested where the institution has it within its power to do
so. This would mean that when African Americans come forward with
sure evidence of racial bias by police over the general run of cases, and
the police could collect facts to disprove this, they would be under an
obligation to do so. Failure to do so should be viewed as a concession
that the complaining party's assertions are correct, or would in fact be
borne out if the evidence were collected. Alternatively, failure to answer
the question when it is possible to do so should encourage institutional
sanctions-withholding of police department funding, perhaps, or the
tying of funding to the taking of particular actions aimed at rooting out
the problem.
This approach has several advantages. By reconceptualizing the
ground rules for our discussion of important issues like race and policing,
we put ourselves in a position that moves us away from endless posturing
and defensiveness and toward the gathering of real facts upon which we
can make the best choices. For example, if a state or municipality col-
lected data on its traffic stops and found that the data did not support the
assertion that police were using race as a factor in traffic stops, those
concerned with the issue might feel the beginnings of some greater de-
gree of trust in the police, and all involved could move on to work
together on important issues of public safety. If, on the other hand, the
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data show some evidence that profiling is taking place, the department
could begin to root it out and make changes in training and supervision
that seem indicated. Police and those they serve could then begin a bet-
ter relationship in which they work together, instead of perceiving
themselves on the opposite sides of some great divide. And best of all,
the issue would be resolved not in the courts, where the adversarial sys-
tem can encourage a mentality of war and confrontation, but within the
institutions that have the expertise and the mission of working on and
solving these problems.
CONCLUSION
Much of the current debate over racial profiling has centered on the
quest for evidence and hard numbers in an effort to move beyond the
anecdotal. Some of this has, in fact, been accomplished in early studies,
and all of them point in the same direction: Using different data from
different police departments, we see that we may, indeed, have a prob-
lem. Nevertheless, it is true that the data are not all that one could want.
That is why those who feel profiling is a problem have proposed the
comprehensive collection of data on all routine traffic stops to fill the
blanks in our knowledge. But opponents have used the lack of data to
argue that there is no problem-despite the fact that it is within their
control to collect the data and make it available for study. Thus they
stack the deck: they claim there is no problem, but block any attempt to
obtain the information to draw this-or any other-conclusion.
The terms of the debate, and any debate involving sensitive ques-
tion of race and criminal justice should be changed. As long as there is
prima facie evidence that indicates that a problem may, indeed, exist, the
burden should shift to the public institutions accused of discrimination to
produce data where it is within their power to do so. Only by requiring
that institutions respond to us in this way can citizens have the confi-
dence that our police departments are using the vast and important
powers we give them in a fair and even handed way-a way that honors
the overarching American principle of equal justice under law.
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